Introduction
In writing the history of political thought there is a danger that one's estimation of a thinker is unduly influenced by the subsequent reputation, no matter how well deserved, that the thinker has come to possess. This can lead not only to distorted and anachronistic readings of past texts, but also to mistakes about their significance to contemporaries. My aim in this paper is to suggest a particular case in which the subsequent eminence of a thinker may have clouded our assessment of how they were received by one of their sharpest contemporaries. The case in question is Adam Smith's intellectual encounter with Jean-Jacques Rousseau. to that which presently prevails. This may seem surprising, or even redundant, insofar as Hont already presents himself as offering a position distinct from that to be found in the existing scholarship. But where that difference lies is a matter that needs careful consideration, one we must review before proceeding.
Hont claims that Rousseau is typically taken to be a fierce critic of commercial modernity, whilst Smith is standardly depicted as its defender (or apologist). Hont himself rejects this dichotomy: both Smith and Rousseau ought to be considered theorists of commercial society, who are attempting to explain its foundations, predicaments, and possibilities. 2 Force, for whom Smith was an 'admirer' of Rousseau 4 , or Dennis Rasmussen, who claims that Smith took Rousseau's arguments 'quite seriously, for in his view they pointed to the deepest and seemingly most intractable problems of the emerging commercial societies of his time' 5 . But he does credit Rousseau's concept of pity as leaving a direct mark on Smith's thought, and suggests that crucial aspects of the Scot's political system are specific replies to the Genevan. 6 Overall, Hont agrees with most other commentators that when Smith read Rousseau, he registered him as a major intellectual interlocutor and challenger.
Of course, believing that Rousseau influenced Smith by itself settles nothing of further significance. There is protracted debate about how Rousseau did so, to what extent and where Smith responded, and who had the better of things on a variety of intellectual fronts. Yet all of these further questions are affected by whether Smith did take Rousseau particularly seriously, and was in various ways preoccupied with responding to his challenge(s). If that turns out not to be so, or at least not in the regards often supposed, then the proffered answers will be in varying ways inadequate because the wrong starting questions will have been asked. To see why the wrong questions may indeed have been asked, we must bring the foundations of Hont's own project more clearly into focus. 27 Due to the capacity to sympathize with others, man was 'the creature of the universe, who has the most ardent desire of society, and is fitted for it by the most advantages'. 28 But Hume did not maintain that man was therefore straightforwardly naturally sociable. The trouble came not from 'honour', as Hobbes had supposed, but 'advantage'. The pursuit of material interests led men into conflict, threatening to destabilize social arrangements because of the co-ordination problems generated by the instability of possessions combined with the limited generosity of men in conditions of moderate scarcity. Artifice was ultimately required in order for humans to achieve large and lasting society, but it was not that of overawing sovereign power, as Hobbes had supposed, or the invention of systems of morality and honour by legislator figures, as
Mandeville claimed. Rather, it was the convention (and subsequently, virtue) of justice: a spontaneously developed, but artificial, response to the need to co-ordinate utilityseeking across groups of self-interested, but nonetheless sympathetically-capable, individuals. Hume's theory of justice was an 'epicurean' account of sociability, but one that hoped to avoid the licentious and scandalous implications associated with Hobbes and Mandeville.
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There is no doubt that Smith knew Hume's position intimately. Not only had he read the Treatise in detail whilst an unhappy visiting undergraduate at the University of Oxford, 30 but in the TMS he supplied a compact summary of Hume's view, 31 and endorsed his central conclusion (albeit with technical modifications) that the organization of utility-seeking was the central sociability question, hence why justice was to be considered the 'main pillar' that upheld society, benevolence its mere 'ornament'. 32 The point of this for present purposes, however, is that compared to Hume's complex position, Rousseau's account of pity in the Discourse would have struck Smith as extremely basic, far behind the best English work available.
Rousseau's position was that (as Smith put it in his review) pity was 'in itself no virtue' 33 , but was more like an instinct, possessed by many animals as well as savage man in his primitive condition: 'a natural sentiment which, by moderating in every individual the activity of self-love, contributes to the mutual preservation of the entire species'. 34 The central function of pity in Rousseau's sociability story was to discredit Hobbes's claim that in the state of nature man was naturally aggressive and violently competitive for status: 'in the state of Nature', pity 'takes the place of Laws, morals, and virtue, with the advantage that no one is tempted to disobey its gentle voice; pity that will keep any sturdy Savage from robbing a weak child or an infirm old man of his hard-won subsistence if he can hope to find his own elsewhere'. 35 Hobbes's vision was a backprojection of civilized man into his primordial state. 36 The proof that it was a backprojection, and a false one at that, was that it would have been impossible for men to ever group together long enough to escape their situation of primitive indolence if they were naturally aggressive in the way Hobbes supposed. Instead, Rousseau deduced, man had originally been solitary (Hobbes was right that there was no principle of natural sociability), yet nonetheless non-aggressive due to the possession of pity. He had ultimately entered society not by being overawed by superior power, but (as Smith summarized) because of some 'unfortunate accidents having given birth to the unnatural passions of ambition and the vain desire of superiority'. 37 Crucial to Rousseau's story, however, was that natural pity was extensively suppressed after his amour propre -i.e. the desire for recognition -became pathologically inflamed due to contact with economic inequality and the rise of luxury. 38 According to Rousseau, in modern conditions when pity was suppressed and amour propre was inflamed, yet amour de soi-meme -i.e. the material needs of the body -remained still active, the only materials human beings had to form society were, as Hobbes claimed, honour and advantage. Hobbes's mistake was thinking that human beings had always been like this. What he was not wrong about was how they were now. we must instead consider the wider evidence from Smith's own published positions.
Praise and Praiseworthiness
Ryan Patrick Hanley has demonstrated that Smith's central distinction between the love of mere praise, and the love of being genuinely praiseworthy, functions as a response to Rousseau's claim that 'commercial society is fundamentally driven by a vanity that threatens to corrupt its participants'. 43 According to Rousseau, 'commercial society stimulates in men a desire for esteem and consideration such that they can only live in the eyes and opinions of others. Such individuals, plagued by solicitude for recognition, can no longer achieve the simple goodness natural to them in their uncorrupted, selfsufficient state'. 44 Living always in the eyes of others, men developed the distinction between being and appearing to be -between être and paraître -and in the process lost the capacity for virtue, possessing only its simulacrum in the gratification of amour propre.
Smith recognised this danger, but believed that it could be resisted. 'To avoid such slavishness, nature invested man with a second side…in which the praises of others are mitigated by a natural regard for what is praiseworthy'. 45 Man desired not simply to appear virtuous, but to be virtuous. Indeed, Smith went so far as to claim that 'so far is the love of praise-worthiness from being derived altogether from that of praise; that the love of praise seems, at least in a great measure, to be derived from that of praiseworthiness'. 46 As Hanley concludes, 'Through the love of praiseworthiness, nature has supplied not simply a cure for an existing malady but an inoculation against an illness to come, for in a renewed appeal to our natural love of praiseworthiness lies what Smith takes to be the key to recovering virtue in civil society, and thereby returning civilized man from a concern with paraître to the love of être'. needs to be done, institutionally, to stymie and control that. This is not to suggest that Smith was therefore blasé about the potential for ethical corruption unleashed by inequality, the desire of material possessions, and the servility towards the rich and the great that the human predilection for sympathy with superiors generated. It ought to be clear to any reader of his texts that these matters concerned him deeply. The present point is a more limited one: that Smith held these concerns independent of his engagement with Rousseau, and the Genevan's polemic cannot satisfactorily be viewed as a, let alone the, decisive spur to Smith's concerns about moral corruption in commercial society. what is commendable and praise-worthy, as being done from a love of praise and commendation, or as he calls it from vanity'. 56 Against this Smith maintains that 'the love of virtue' is 'the noblest and best passion in human nature', and that even 'the love of true glory' whilst inferior to the love of true virtue, 'in dignity appears to come immediately after it'. 57 Men of real magnanimity will still desire to be praised for their virtues, but they are conscious that this is because their virtues are deserving of real glory and this holds even if they don't actually receive the praise they are owed. By contrast, 'none but the weakest and most worthless of mankind are delighted with false glory'. 61 Hume divided the virtues into 'natural' and 'artificial', where the existence of the former was evidenced by immediate sympathetic responses to the imputed motivations of other agents, whilst the latter required some external convention to be in place before they could be made intelligible. 62 Smith, by contrast, backed up the story to ask how it was possible there could be any virtues at all, even the putatively natural ones. This was a facet of the question of sociability: before one could examine the content of morality, one had to know where it came from -and that meant exploring the origins of society. This Smith did in Part III of TMS, where he offered a conjectural history of human ethical capacities as rooted in repeat iterations of judging and being judged over long periods of time.
Morality, for Smith, was ultimately socially composed, an outcome of having to live in the gaze of others. 63 By doing this, however, Smith sailed much closer to Mandevillean shores than Hume. For the older Scott, precisely because there were 'natural' virtues antecedent to reflection, Mandeville's claim that all moral virtue was fraudulent, in his notorious phrase merely 'the Political Offspring which Flattery begot upon Pride', could be straightforwardly dismissed. 64 And Mandeville was also wildly off-target with regards to the artificial virtues: the manipulation of sociable behaviour by self-interested legislator figures mistook a secondary re-enforcement effect for a primary cause of sociability, which Hume instead located in the artifice of justice. 65 Smith had to take Mandeville much more seriously because he essentially agreed with the Dutchman that the origins of all morality lay in repeat experiences of social interaction with judging peers. As Hanley writes, 'insofar as sympathy is natural', nonetheless 'Smith seems to argue that it is natural for our natures to be shaped by convention. But at the same time, Smith clearly foresaw the possible consequence of such an ethics if pursued to its conclusion -namely that an individual shaped by the morality of sympathy would be preeminently a slave to the strong need that men have for the approbation of their fellows'. 66 This explains why
Smith could write that 'how destructive soever' Mandeville's system might appear, 'it could never have imposed upon so great a number of persons, nor have occasioned so general an alarm among those who are the friends of better principles, had it not in some respects bordered upon the truth'. 67 This was an assessment Hume would never have Yet Smith's felt need to make good on his arguments was a product of the demands incumbent upon his own system, given his unwavering commitment not to cede the field to Mandeville, instead consistently denying that a socially-composed origins theory of the foundations of morals must therefore be a sceptical or debunking one. As a result, Rousseau featured not as a source of any great influence or intellectual threat, but as merely repeating a challenge that Smith had already long-registered, and knew that his own position needed to address.
Utility and Deception
I turn now to Part IV of the TMS, where Smith directly paraphrases Rousseau's arguments from the Discourse. Surely here we can discern the latter's profound influence upon the former? I suggest not. The reasons are revealed by paying close attention to Smith's wider purposes and strategy of argument.
Part IV is primarily a response to Hume's claim, stated in the Treatise and repeated even more forthrightly in the second Enquiry, that a regard for utility is the dominant factor in explaining value judgements. According to Hume, Smith reminded his readers, the 'utility of any object…pleases the master by perpetually suggesting to him the pleasure or conveniency which it is fitted to promote', with spectators able to share in this pleasure via sympathy. 68 Despite the initial plausibility of this account Smith insisted that it was subtly and importantly mistaken. In fact, human psychology exhibited a pervasive and wide-ranging quirk, such that the 'fitness, this happy contrivance of any production of art, should often be more valued, than the very end for which it was intended'. Bizarrely -at least, to a sober philosophical eye -'the exact adjustment of the means for attaining any conveniency or pleasure, should frequently be more regarded, than that very conveniency or pleasure, in the attainment of which their whole merit would seem to consist'. 69 Smith took himself to be the first to have noticed this yet pointed to a multitude of everyday examples to prove its truth: the man who expends much effort arranging the chairs in a room to achieve an order which costs him more in convenience than is gained by having the floor clear; the person who is excessively curious about watches and rejects one model on the grounds that it loses two minutes in a day, replacing it with a much more expensive one that only loses a minute in a fortnight, despite both being perfectly adequate for the basic function of telling the time;
he who adores 'trinkets of frivolous utility' and walks about 'loaded with a multitude of baubles' which cost him more inconveniency to constantly carry about than can ever be gained from having them to hand. ' The dominant motive for engaging in economic activitybeyond providing for one's bodily needs -is the non-material desire for social status'. 73 Hont likewise claims that Smith 'rehearsed' Hume's point that continuous consumption of material goods beyond the point of needs-satiation was not simply about utility but about the 'beauty of their design that pleased their owners', but he nonetheless concludes that 'Smith conceded Rousseau's case, also describing the hectic culture of status seeking as a giant deception'. 74 These readings, however, subtly misconstrue Smith's argument. 75 For it is categorically not status recognition that does the central work in Smith's account, at least in Part IV. The 'love of distinction so natural to man', he tells us, is at best only a secondary consideration in explaining the human tendency towards luxury consumption. The primary factor is the quirk of human rationality Smith takes himself to be the first to have identified. The poor man's son feels his daily inconveniences and compares those to what he imagines are the pleasure of the rich, afforded to them by their many devices for promoting utility. Whereas he must walk, they ride in carriages;
whereas he must labour for all his wants, they have a retinue of servants. The poor son sees these conveniences and imagines that because they are fitted to promote pleasure they therefore make the rich happy -and that if he had them, then he too would be happy. Accordingly, the poor son becomes 'enchanted with the distant idea of felicity', and devotes himself to the endless 'pursuit of wealth and greatness'. But the outcome is a paradox: the poor son spends his life toiling to achieve wealth as a means of securing instruments of pleasure, and in the process expends far more effort, and incurs far more inconvenience, than could ever be compensated for by the riches he manages to amass.
'Through the whole of his life he pursues the idea of a certain artificial and elegant repose which he may never arrive at, for which he sacrifices a real tranquility that is at all times in his power'. The situation ends in irony: because the poor son is enchanted with the idea of utility-promotion rather than utility itself, he will never achieve the levels of wealth that he thinks will make him happy. Such levels are constantly receding from him due to the very quirk of human psychology that makes him pursue the imagined means of pleasure rather than solidly attainable pleasures themselves. In old age such a man may finally come to see, with regret and bitterness, the error of his ways: that 'wealth and greatness are mere trinkets of frivolous utility, no more adapted for procuring ease of body or tranquility of mind than the tweezer-cases of the lover of toys'. But by then it will largely be too late, and he will realise that he has wasted most of his life in chimerical pursuits. 76 It is important to recognise, however, that Smith's poor man's son is an extreme example. He is not supposed to represent how all people typically think and behave, but merely illustrates, in acute and dramatic form, those tendencies that are much less pronounced in ordinary well-adjusted people. Smith did not deny that the condition of the rich and the great received widespread admiration, and that this forwarded the desire of ordinary people to themselves become rich and great. However:
If we examine…why the spectator distinguishes with such admiration the condition of the rich and the great, we shall find that it is not so much upon account of the superior ease or pleasure which they are supposed to enjoy as of the numberless artificial and elegant contrivances for promoting this ease or pleasure. He does not even imagine that they are really happier than other people: but he imagines that they possess more means of happiness. And it is the ingenious and artful adjustment of those means to the end for which they were intended, that is the principle source of his admiration. 77 Yet matters are complicated by the fact that Smith appears to take a much more
Rousseau-like position in TMS Part I. He there writes that 'To be observed, to be attended to, to be taken notice of with sympathy, complacency, and approbation, are all the advantages which we can propose to derive' from 'that great purpose of human life which we call bettering our condition'. Indeed, Smith even seems to contradict what he later says in Part IV, declaring that 'It is the vanity, not the ease, or the pleasure, which interests us'. 78 This passage is what commentators seem to have in mind when they claim that Smith concedes Rousseau's claim about amour propre as the underlying driver of material consumption beyond bare necessity. But we must read carefully. The context of these passages is Smith's claim that 'mankind are disposed to sympathize more entirely with our joy than our sorrow', where he follows Hume's view that we tend to love and esteem, rather than hate and envy, the rich and powerful. 79 Yet Smith's 'vanity' is not Rousseau's amour propre. The notes of the Discourse specified amour propre to be 'a relative sentiment…which inclines every individual to set greater store by himself than by anyone else, inspires men with all the evils they do one another'. 80 In contrast to this, what Smith claims in TMS Part 1 is that individuals pursue riches because observers sympathize with the pleasure that the rich ought to receive from their wealth, and this in turn augments the pleasures the rich themselves expect from their material affluence. 81 'The rich man glories in his riches, because he feels that they naturally draw upon him the attention of the world, and that mankind are disposed to go along with him in all those agreeable emotions with which the advantages of his situation so readily inspire him'. 82 According to Rousseau we primarily desire riches to rub other people's noses in our superiority: 'the ardent desire to raise one's relative fortune less out of genuine need than in order to place oneself above others, instills in all men a black inclination to harm one another…and always the hidden desire to profit at another's expense'. 83 For Smith, by contrast, we pursue riches to augment the pleasures that wealth brings by the added pleasure that arises from having others themselves take pleasure, via sympathy, in our prosperous condition. Hence 'that emulation which runs through all the different ranks of men' is not a zero-sum game of brute status competition, but a complex product of the capacity to share each other's sentiments, made in the context of Smith's central claim that having other people agree with our sentiments via sympathy is inherently pleasurable.
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The difference between Smith and Rousseau is ultimately pronounced. The
Discourse postulated that a figure like the 'poor man's son' was motivated primarily by competitive amour propre in a zero-sum competition for status (and inevitably so since pity had been fatally suppressed, meaning that men could only compete with each other not share each other's sentiments). Furthermore, following the introduction of private property and the advent of inequality, the poor man's son was not the extreme, but the archetype, of how corrupted human beings behaved in contemporary conditions. Smith rejected both these claims. The desire for riches and greatness, and the admiration of the rich and the great, were primarily motivated not by the competitive seeking of recognition in the eyes of peers, but by two other features of human psychology. First, the quirk which encouraged men to value the means of utility-promotion more than utility itself. Second, the propensity, via sympathy, to take pleasure not in the actual pleasures of the rich, but in the pleasures one imagined that they ought to take (even if they in fact didn't) from their possessions, and in turn the pleasure, via sympathy, that the rich themselves took from knowing that others took pleasure in observing their
condition. Yet this view was one that Smith arrived at through a correction of Hume's ideas, both with regards to the quirk of rationality regarding utility as explicated in Part IV, but also with the claim that individuals pursue luxuries to augment their pleasures as a function of Smith's central contention that 'mutual sympathy pleases' -the very aspect of Smith's system that Hume labeled its 'hinge', but believed to be a mistake. 85 Genevan posited that market activity was driven by an irreducibly competitive desire for superior status -luxury was both the focus of amour propre, and pathologically inflamed it -Smith claimed that the majority of material appropriation beyond the satisfaction of bare necessity was the result of a product of the quirk of our rationality when it came to estimating pleasures, their means of attainment, and the corresponding connection to happiness. Smith certainly described this as a deception -but it was not the one that Rousseau supposed.
The second metric along which the notion of deception may be considered relates to how economic inequality, arising from market interactions and the rise of luxury, interacted with the basis of political power in large-scale advanced societies.
Rousseau's claim in the Discourse was that the rich originally tricked the poor into accepting the property rights that formalized and entrenched material inequality, fooling them into believing that this would be to their own advantage. 'All ran toward their chains in the belief that they were securing their freedom; for while they had enough reason to sense the advantages of a political establishment, they had not enough experience to foresee its dangers'. 86 The 'deception' therefore amounted, as Michael
Rosen has noted, to a form of false consciousness. 87 Smith entertained no such thing, Although it was the designs of the rich for their own pleasure that originally stimulated much economic activity, the paradoxical outcome was to improve the lot of all, as market-consumption stimulated demand and the rising tide of economic productivity lifted all boats. 97 As Hont notes, by making this move Smith firmly aligned himself with Locke and Mandeville, and against Rousseau, in the tradition of thought that held that the division of the world into unequal propertied holdings was on balance justified insofar as the result of the economic activity such inequality stimulated made the worstoff vastly better off than they could have been if the earth remained communally owned and yet uncultivated. Smith located the primary 'deception' that gave rise to property, productivity, marketexchanges, and eventually large-scale inequality, not in the desire for recognition -and not even in his own, sympathetically-modified, account from Part I -but in the quirk of human rationality regarding utility-seeking he took himself to be the first to have noticed.
In other words, both the premises and the conclusions of Rousseau's case were mistaken.
The more general point for present purposes is that in seeing this we can also appreciate that rather than Rousseau being Smith's primary target in Part IV, he featured as something more like collateral damage. Once Hume's account of utility was properly corrected to make the central 'deception' in human psychology the quirk of rationality with regards the means rather than the ends of pleasure, Smith could in passing also explain what was wrong with the recent polemic from the continent, recycling the key passages he'd translated in his earlier review to this effect. In this case, one prominent thinker's paraphrasing of another corresponds to their marginal, rather than central, importance.
The extent to which Smith's own view of the 'deception' that lies behind economic consumption is darkly pessimistic, or perhaps ultimately more sanguine than might be supposed, is a matter requiring further interpretation. 100 But whatever the 
Conclusion
Despite what might reasonably be supposed, and is indeed assumed in the much of the existing literature, when Smith read Rousseau's Second Discourse he did not register it as the work of a particularly important or challenging interlocutor. As a result, the influence of Rousseau upon Smith is at best minimal and secondary. One reason for this, I have tried to suggest, is that it is a mistake (even if an understandable one) to assume that because the Discourse was published in 1755, and the TMS in 1759, and because both survey much of the same or similar terrain, that they must therefore share the same intellectual context. 101 Rousseau be read as theorists of how large-scale politics can operate in a world of market-interactions that yield material, social, and political inequalities that need both to be made intelligible to those subject to them, and be stable enough to prevent the collapse of the systems of exchange and opulence that generate them in the first place.
Inequality is today very much back at the heart of political debate and popular concern.
Although the gap between developed and developing nations is shrinking, disparities of wealth within developed nations have increased dramatically and consistently over the past three decades. 103 If the argument of Thomas Piketty's recent surprise bestseller
Capital in the Twenty-First Century is correct, this is no accident. 104 That absent the unusual political circumstances of the past hundred years -in particular two world wars and the presence for several decades of powerful competitor ideologies to liberal democratic capitalism -the twenty-first century is much more likely to resemble the nineteenth than the twentieth, because when left unchecked and free from political interference, capitalism tends to concentrate wealth, reinforcing and expanding existing inequalities. If that is indeed so, then questions of how much inequality market-based societies can bear, whilst remaining stable both politically and economically, are likely to come once again firmly to the fore. In looking for insights into how to theorize -and maybe even address -the predicaments of capitalist inequality, Smith and Rousseau may represent attractive starting points. But in picking up their texts today, separated by 250 years of historical change and many varieties of intellectual amnesia, we must not assume that they simply started from the same place, or can be read as on an equal footing. That Smith was apparently unmoved by Rousseau's diagnosis of the predicaments of commercial societies invites us to consider whether we ought likewise to be cautious of using the Genevan as a guide, and whether the Scot offers a more advantageous point of departure from which to try and make sense of our difficult present.
